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Integrating Sustainable Development in International Investment Law, by Manjiao 
Chi 
Abstract 
The idea of sustainable development has a long history and is comparable to that of democracy, freedom, 
and justice.3 In the twenty-first century, sustainable development is an unavoidable paradigm 
underpinning all human actions from local to global levels, in both the public and private sectors. 
Sustainable development is high on the global governance agenda and needs to be followed by making a 
balance between the competing priorities of economic growth, environmental protection, and social 
progress.4 Sustainable development, on the one hand, is closely dependent on transnational investment 
activities to promote economic growth, especially in developing countries. On the other hand, it requires 
foreign investors to consider socio-environmental issues associated with their investment activities. 
Despite the universal importance of the role of transnational investment activities in sustainable 
development, whether and to what extent international investment law could amount to a legal norm that 
protects socio-environmental values while encouraging economic growth is not a settled issue. 
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HANIEHALSADAT ABOUTORABIFARD2 
THE IDEA OF SUSTAINABLE development has a long history and is comparable to 
that of democracy, freedom, and justice.3 In the twenty-frst century, sustainable 
development is an unavoidable paradigm underpinning all human actions 
from local to global levels, in both the public and private sectors. Sustainable 
development is high on the global governance agenda and needs to be followed 
by making a balance between the competing priorities of economic growth, 
environmental protection, and social progress.4 Sustainable development, on the 
one hand, is closely dependent on transnational investment activities to promote 
economic growth, especially in developing countries. On the other hand, 
it requires foreign investors to consider socio-environmental issues associated 
with their investment activities. Despite the universal importance of the role of 
1. Integrating Sustainable Development in International Investment Law: Normative 
Incompatibility, System Integration and Governance Implications (Routledge, 2018) [Chi, 
Integrating Sustainable Development]. 
2. PhD student at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. 
3. See World Commission on Environment and Development, Te Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, UNGAOR, 42nd Sess, 
Supp No 25, UN Doc A/42/427 (1987). Te report notes that “[s]ustainable development 
is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the 
future generation to meet their own needs” (ibid at 54). 
4. Virginie Barral, “Sustainable Development in International Law: Nature and Operation of an 
Evolutive Legal Norm” (2012) 23 Eur J Intl L 377 at 379. 











transnational investment activities in sustainable development, whether and to 
what extent international investment law could amount to a legal norm that 
protects socio-environmental values while encouraging economic growth is not 
a settled issue.5 
Manjiao Chi, a scholar of international law at Xiamen University, notes 
that, although sustainable development has been a global objective for decades, 
difculties persist in establishing a balanced global investment governance 
regime.6 According to Integrating Sustainable Development in International 
Investment Law, the current international investment agreements (IIAs) and 
investment-state dispute settlement (ISDS) form the main constituents of 
international investment law.7 However, Chi argues that these two constituents 
are not sufciently compatible with sustainable development concerns caused by 
transnational investment activities. First, IIAs chiefy supply norms designed for 
protecting investors against the political and economic instability of developing 
countries.8 Meredith Wilensky, in 2015, also raised a similar critique that IIAs are 
mainly negotiated to safeguard foreign investors,9 but Chi furthers the discussion 
by linking the failure of IIAs to consider values beyond the economic prosperity of 
foreign investments to sustainable development. Second, IIAs are made by states 
to promote the fow of foreign investments and fuel investment business among 
contracting parties.10 And thus the rights of non-state actors afected by foreign 
investments, such as local communities, are rarely considered in the IIA-making 
process. Tird, although the impacts of foreign investments go beyond economic 
issues and cause public international concerns, the fragmentation of international 
law leaves little space for ISDS tribunals to address socio-environmental 
5. It is argued that the lack of an efective regime in addressing sustainable development leaves 
this legal norm uncertain in the international law system. See e.g. Christina Voigt, Sustainable 
Development as a Principle of International Law: Resolving Conficts between Climate Measures 
and WTO Law (Martinus Nijhof, 2009). 
6. Chi, Integrating Sustainable Development, supra note 1. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid. 
9. “Reconciling International Investment Law and Climate Change Policy: Potential Liability 
for Climate Measures Under the Trans-Pacifc Partnership” (2015) 45 Envtl L Rep 10683. 
10. Since IIAs can have a wide range of implications for host states’ legal systems, economies, 
and individual citizens, non-state actors such as NGOs should be involved in the IIA-making 
process. See Stephan W Schill, “Five Times Transparency in International Investment Law” 
(2014) in Marc Bungenberg & August Reinisch, eds, Special Issue, Te Anatomy of the 
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concerns associated with transnational investment activities.11 Terefore, foreign 
investments that are supposed to bring economic prosperity to host countries 
may give rise to a wide range of public concerns. 
Chi was inspired by the International Institution for Sustainable Development 
(IISD) Conference focused on IIA negotiation and developing countries to write 
this book about international investment law and sustainable development.12 
A call for integrating sustainable development in IIAs, therefore, is key for 
Chi to make international investment law more compatible with sustainable 
development. Te question that centers his book is how to improve IIA-making 
and IIA-enforcement processes in the context of sustainable development? 
According to this book, integrating sustainable development in international 
investment law is a systemic study of using conceptual, normative, and governance 
perspectives.13 Te book is split into three parts: (1) the sustainable development 
challenge for IIAs, (2) core sustainable development provisions in IIAs, and 
(3) reforming IIAs to be more compatible with sustainable development. Chi 
initiates his research by focusing on two sustainable development-impeding 
provisions: Expropriation and fair and equitable treatment (FET). He analyzes 
how the wording of these substantive provisions and their applications in ISDS 
may restrict states from pursuing sustainable development goals within the 
investment sector. In the second part, Chi explores thematic issues of various 
types of clauses in IIAs that are intended to promote sustainable development 
and discusses their normative and enforcement obstacles. In the fnal section of 
the book, he concludes why the existing global investment governance regime 
is not sufciently compatible with sustainable development and raises three 
suggestions for enhancing future IIA-making. 
Similar to the majority of international agreements, IIAs also limit the 
scope of domestic police power to administrative regulations, to which foreign 
investors must subject themselves.14 Despite its lack of defnition, state police 
power implies that states have regulatory fexibility and policy space to fulfll 
their public interests. However, substantive provisions, such as expropriation 
and FET, could hinder host states from implementing sustainable development 
measures. In practice, if host states’ socio-environmental measures adversely 
11. Saverio Di Benedetto, International Investment Law and the Environment
(Edward Elgar, 2013). 
12. Chi, Integrating Sustainable Development, supra note 1. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, 2nd 
(Oxford University Press, 2012). 










afect the value, economic, or commercial use of foreign investments, investors 
will bring claims before ISDS tribunals for breaching the substantive provisions 
of IIAs. FET is a core pro-investment provision that “may constrict a State’s 
sovereignty considerably and … threatens sustainable development.”15 Te 
application of these substantive provisions in ISDS brings host states under the 
external scrutiny of international investment tribunals that signifcantly narrow 
the boundary of a state’s involvement in global investment governance.16 
To respond to the restraining efects of the substantive provisions, Chi 
shifts the focus of his research towards striking a balance between investment 
protection and environmental considerations by elaborating on sustainable 
development-promoting provisions included in IIAs.17 Trough rules analysis, 
comparative research, and case studies, he identifes core sustainable development 
provisions in existing IIAs, including exceptive provisions, public interest 
provisions, and procedural provisions.Exceptive provisions that provide conditions 
under which host states’ regulatory actions will be excepted from breaching FET 
standards are one of the most illuminative provisions promoting sustainable 
development. IIAs have recently incorporated exceptive provisions to exempt 
host states from liability for taking IIA-inconsistent measures for public interest 
concerns.18 “Some IIAs, especially recent ones, incorporate exceptive provisions 
to address various kinds of public interest concerns, such as the protection of 
national security interests, [and] the preservation and protection of life.”19 With 
reference to these provisions, host states might be exonerated from expropriating 
foreign investments and breaching FET standards. For instance, GATT article 
XX is an exceptive clause whereby WTO members may justify their sustainable 
development measures that are inconsistent with WTO obligations, if such 
15. Roland Kläger, “Revising Treatment Standards—Fair and Equitable Treatment in Light of 
Sustainable Development” in Stefen Hindelang & Markus Krajewski, eds, Shifting Paradigms 
in International Investment Law: More Balanced, Less Isolated, Increasingly Diversifed (Oxford 
University Press, 2016) 65 at 67. 
16. Scholars in the feld of sustainable development and international investment law consider 
expropriation and the FET clauses as a “powerful weapon” for foreign investors to not 
only limit state sovereignty in pursuing public interests but also expose state conduct 
under further scrutiny of international arbitral tribunals. See e.g. GC Christie, “What 
Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International Law?” (1962) 38 Brit YB Intl L 307; 
Roland Kläger, “Fair and Equitable Treatment” in International Investment Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
17. Chi, Integrating Sustainable Development, supra note 1. 
18. Kenneth J Vandevelde, “Rebalancing Trough Exceptions” (2013) 17 Lewis 
Clark L Rev 449. 
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measures fall under paragraphs a, b, e, f, and g of article XX.20 Transplanting 
GATT article XX to IIAs, therefore, is an efective avenue for promoting the 
sustainable development goal of foreign investments while exempting a host state 
from being accountable for expropriation or an FET violation. 
Parallel to reviewing the sustainable development provisions, Chi outlines 
challenges facing exceptive, public interest, and procedural provisions. High 
threshold requirements for invoking exceptive provisions in ISDS, for example, 
are the main barriers to sustainable development integration into the global 
investment governance regime. Requirements such as a two-tiered test weaken 
the practical efectiveness of exceptive provisions for promoting sustainable 
development. A classic enumeration of the two-tiered test can be found in the 
US–Gasoline Appellate Body report:21 
In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be extended to it, the 
measure at issue must not only come under one or another of the particular 
exceptions–paragraphs (a) to (j)–listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy the 
requirements imposed by the opening clauses of Article XX. Te analysis is, in other 
words, two-tiered: frst, provisional justifcation by reason of characterization of 
the measure under XX(g); second, further appraisal of the same measure under the 
introductory clauses of Article XX. 
20. General Agreement on Tarifs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 58 UNTS 187 (entered into force 
1 January 1948) [GATT]. Article XX of the GATT reads: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting 
party of measures: 
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
[…] 
(e) relating to the products of prison labour; 
(f ) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value; 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
efective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption (ibid). 
21. United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (1996), WTO Doc WT/ 
DS2/AB/R at 22 (Appellate Body Report), online (pdf ): <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/2-9.pdf> [perma.cc/Y4BL-MTAC]. 











Tis two-step test needs ISDS tribunals to decide whether the socio-environmental 
measures in question fall under paragraphs a, b, e, f, and g of article XX of the 
GATT.22 If the frst step is satisfed, the tribunals would proceed to the second 
phase to determine whether the requirements of this article are fulflled. Due 
to the high invocation requirements of the exceptive provisions, they have 
been rarely invoked in ISDS and are often dismissed by investment tribunals.23 
According to a study by Public Citizen, up to August 2015, there had been 
forty-three WTO cases in which GATT article XX had been invoked by host 
states, however, only one case satisfed all requirements for being exempted from 
breaching FET.24 Te result of this case study shows that investor arbitrators 
often employ a rigid interpretation style for the GATT exceptive provision and 
demonstrates that there is a strong bias in favor of investment protection over 
sustainable development in ISDS.25 
Chapter fve of this book discusses the overlap between protecting public 
interests and promoting sustainable development. Since international law often 
deals with interstate relations, the inclusion of public interests in international 
investment law seems to be of paramount importance. However, IIAs appear 
disinterested in addressing public issues, other than investment protection. Tis 
is due to the fact that international investment law has been developed in light of 
fragmentation theory,26 which divides the tracks of various felds of international 
law.27 Te economic motivations behind negotiating IIAs also tend to limit 
the scope of provisions to those favoring investments. Te potential adverse 
22. Ibid. 
23. Kati Kulovesi, Te WTO Dispute Settlement System: Challenges of the Environment, Legitimacy 
and Fragmentation (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2011). 
24. “Only One of 44 Attempts to Use the GATT Article XX/GATS Article XIV ‘General 
Exception’ Has Ever Succeeded: Replicating the WTO Exception Construct Will 
Not Provide for an Efective TPP General Exception” (August 2015) at 1-2, online 
(pdf ): Public Citizen <www.citizen.org/sites/default/fles/general-exception_4.pdf> 
[perma.cc/K466-7VU7]. 
25. Manjiao Chi, “Exhaustible Natural Resource in WTO Law: GATT Article XX (g) Disputes 
and Teir Implications” (2014) 48 J World Trade 939. 
26. Fragmentation theory supports the autonomy of IIAs with respect to other rules of 
international law; it applies to cases where rules belonging to diferent regimes are applied 
in ISDS tribunals in a potentially conficting way. See Study Group of the International 
Law Commission (fnalized by Martti Koskenniemi), Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difculties Arising from the Diversifcation and Expansion of International Law, UNGAOR, 
58th Sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (2006). 
27. See Benedetto, supra note 11. “Te more “fragmentary” the approach taken, the less likely 
it is that environmental and human health concerns will be integrated when applying 
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impacts that public interest protection could have on institutional attractiveness 
of host states for alluring foreign investors is another reason why IIAs fail to 
address such issue. 
In response, Chi claims that IIAs should be more accommodative to public 
interest provisions covering environmental and human rights.28 He notes that, 
similar to the exceptive provisions, environmental provisions, for example, 
would promote sustainable development by exempting host states from liability 
for taking IIA-inconsistent environmental measures.29 Te environmental 
provisions included in the 2012 US Model BIT,30 the 2004 Canadian Model 
BIT,31 and the 2005 China–Madagascar BIT,32 serve as references for Chi to 
explain how the environment could be protected in IIAs. Basically, under 
environmental provisions, environmental measures implemented by host states 
do not constitute an act of expropriation and are exempted from the scope of 
the FET clause. However, these provisions are insufciently clear, and their 
interpretation is subject to investment arbitrators’ discretion. Chi examines 
the vague statement of “except in rare circumstance” from the 2004 Canadian 
Model BIT33 to illuminate how “it remains possible for arbitrators to interpret 
the words in a manner inconsistent with the contracting states’ real intention.”34 
28. Manjiao Chi, “Te ‘Greenization’ of Chinese Bits: An Empirical Study of the Environmental 
Provisions in Chinese Bits and its Implications for China’s Future Bit-Making” (2015) 18 J 
Intl Econ L 511. 
29. Chi, Integrating Sustainable Development, supra note 1. 
30. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
[Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (20 April 
2012), Annex B.4 (B), online (pdf ): Ofce of the US Trade Representative <ustr.gov/sites/ 
default/fles/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf> [perma.cc/WV63-KJRK]. 
31. Agreement Between Canada and … for the Promotion and Protection of Investments
(2004), art 10(1)(c), online (pdf ): United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
<investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-fles/2820/ 
download> [perma.cc/VC4M-9QLZ] [2004 Canadian Model BIT]. 
32. China–Madagascar BIT, 21 November 2005, art 3(2) (entered into force 1 July 2007), 
online: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development <investmentpolicy.unctad. 
org/international-investment-agreements/treaties/bilateral-investment-treaties/933/ 
china-madagascar-bit-2005-> [perma.cc/PA86-L6L5]. 
33. See 2004 Canadian Model BIT, supra note 32, Annex B.13(1)(c) reads: 
Except in rare circumstances, such as when a measure or series of measures are so severe in 
the light of their purpose that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having been adopted and 
applied in good faith, non-discriminatory measures of a Party that are designed and applied to 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the environment, do not 
constitute indirect expropriation. 
34. Chi, Integrating Sustainable Development, supra note 1 at 91. 











Despite the frequency of environmentally sensitive expropriation and FET 
claims in ISDS, he notes that no consistent jurisprudence has been established in 
exempting environmental measures from expropriation or an FET violation, and 
the environmental sensitivity of the measures is seldom considered by investment 
tribunals under public interest provisions.35 
In the fnal section of Integrating Sustainable Development in International 
Investment Law, Chi reiterates that the world is in the era of globalization 
that “necessitates a paradigm shift of global investment governance.”36 But 
the fragmentation of international law,37 the state-centrism of international 
investment law,38 and the inherent structural imbalance of existing IIAs39 impede 
broader and more efective investment regulations. In Chi’s opinion, though 
international investment law is a branch of international law, ISDS establishes 
an enforcement system of IIAs that is only available to private investors.40 Failure 
of some investment arbitrators to recognize the public nature of ISDS allows 
an insufcient margin to determine and implement various public policy goals. 
Moreover, IIAs should not only be treated as a regime imposing an investment 
protection obligation on states but must be deemed as a governance mechanism 
arranging rights and obligations divisions among the main stakeholders of 
transnational investment activities. Consequently, the regulatory chill efect of 
IIAs on state sovereignty and the inability of ISDS to protect non-investment 
interests have contributed to the legitimacy crisis in which international 
investment law currently fnds itself. 
According to Chi, sustainable development is a global object that would be 
achieved through its integration into the global investment governance regime. 
To address this situation, Chi has written an excellent scholarly work to “suggest 
ways of making IIA more compatible with sustainable development from 
the governance perspective.”41 First, IIAs are the main supplier for the global 
investment governance regime. Tus, more “balancing provisions” and “good 
governance provisions” could enhance the supply of sustainable development 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid at 149. 
37. See Benedetto, supra note 11. 
38. See Matthew Nicholson, “Walter Benjamin and the Re-Imagination of International Law” 
(2016) 27 Law Crit 103. 
39. See Gus Van Harten, Sovereign Choices and Sovereign Constraints: Judicial Restraint in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
40. Chi, Integrating Sustainable Development, supra note 1. 
41. Ibid at 161. 
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norms in IIAs.42 Second, the systemic theory that perceives IIAs as a unit of 
international law dealing with various public issues is another approach to 
make a balance between socio-environmental considerations and investment 
protection in IIAs. Harmonizing the sustainable development provisions with the 
conficting norms of other branches of international law through proper treaty 
interpretation tools would enable investment tribunals to go beyond the mere 
protection of foreign investments and consider public interests in their decision 
making.43 Tird, since states traditionally play a central role in IIA-making and 
non-state actors are excluded from the process, the IIA system is insufcient for 
addressing the values of multiple stakeholders.44 Improving the transparency 
of and involving non-state actors in the IIA-making process could be a crucial 
approach to integrating sustainable development in IIAs. 
42. See Harten, supra note 39. 
43. See Benedetto, supra note 11. 
44. See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, Te International Law on Foreign Investment 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
